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Clarence J. Moran, GS-15, CIA 

Kurdish Problem-Federalism or an Emerging State 
Individual Study Project 

22 Feb 1993 PAGES: 36 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified 

Whether the Kurds will successfully achieve democracy for Iraq 
and autonomy for Kurdistan is more a decision in the hands of US 
policy makers than the Kurds. Before that question can be 
addressed the larger issue of "autonomy today, but a separate state 
tomorrow" has to be ounridered. No one wants to support a separate 
state which would mean dissolution of the territorial integrity of 
Iraq and upsetting the regional balance of power. That would also 
run counter to respecting the concept of a nation's sovereignty 
which is so vital to maintaining order in the world. when the 
national interests of the US are considered, especially in the 
strategic sense or in terms of natural resources, it is difficult 
to make a case for supporting the Kurds beyond humanitarian 
assistance. The Persian Gulf War, however, presented the US a new 
scenario, highlighted by President Bush's call for the Kurds in 
northern Iraq and the Shia in southern Iraq to rise against Saddam 
Hussein. The resulting crushing of both revolts by Saddam, and 
ensuing flight and agony suffered by the Kurds brought them on 
center stage for the world to view. The US, along with coalition 
governments, in response to media pressure and the humanitarian 
needs of the fleeing Kurds, established a security zone in northern 
Iraq for the Kurds, and later in southern Iraq for the Shia. This 
has effectively split Iraq into three parts. The Kurds by holding 
elections, establishing a government, and providing political and 
civil administration in their area, Iraqi Kurdistan, now in essence 
have de facto autonomy. This autonomy, however, cannot be 
sustained without US and coalition military protection. This study 
explores whether the Kurds are capable of self-government and the 
implications of US policy on the future governmental structure in 



rh« views expressed in this paper are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the Department of Defense ox any of Its agencies. 

This document say not be released for open publication 
until it has been cleared by the appropriate military 
service or government agency. 



Clarence J. Moran 
Central Intelligence Agency ~ 

Dr. Douglas V, Johnson II 
Project Adviser 

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A; Approved for public 
releasej distribution is unllmlted*- 





U a:, -.c 





U.S. Army War College 
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013 



Clarence J. Moran, GS-15, CIA 

Kurdish Problem-Federalism or an Emerging State 
Individual Study Project 

22 Feb 1993 PAGES; 36 CLASSIFICATION; Unclassified 

Whether the Kurds will successfully achieve democracy for Iraq 
and autonomy for Kurdistan is more a decision in the hands of US 
policy makers than the Kurds. Before that question can be 
addressed the larger issue of "autonomy today, but a separate state 
tomorrow" has to be considered. No one wants to support a separate 
state which would mean dissolution of the territorial integrity of 
Iraq and upsetting the regional balance of power. That would also 
run counter to respecting the concept of a nation's sovereignty 
which is so vital to maintaining order in the world. When the 
national interests of the US are considered, especially in the 
strategic sense or in terms of natural resources, it is difficult 
to make a case for supporting the Kurds beyond humanitarian 
assistance. The Persian Gulf War, however, presented the US a new 
scenario, highlighted by President Bush's call for the Kurds in 
northern Iraq and the Shia in southern Iraq to rise against Saddam 
Hussein. The resulting crushing of both revolts by Saddam, and 
ensuing flight and agony suffered by the Kurds brought them on 
center stage for the world to view. The US, along with coalition 
governments, in response to media pressure and the humanitarian 
needs of the fleeing Kurds, established a security zone in northern 
Iraq for the Kurds, and later in southern Iraq for the Shia. This 
has effectively split Iraq into three parts. The Kurds by holding 
elections, establishing a government, and providing political and 
civil administration in their area, Iraqi Kurdistan, now in essence 
have de facto autonomy. This autonomy, however, cannot be 
sustained without US and coalition military protection. This study 
explores whether the Kurds are capable of self-government and the 
implications of US policy on the future governmental structure in 


Figure 1.Oilfields and Facilities 

Figure 2.Ethnoreligious Groups 

Figure 3.Dissident (Kurdish & Shiite) Areas 




The plight of the Kurds is but one of several major problems 
in the Middle East which has attracted United States (US) and world 
attention. The US, pressured by the media and responding to the 
inhumane conditions being suffered by the Kurds after their 
uprising against Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf War, has 
become a primary provider of security to the Kurds in Iraqi 
Kurdistan. This support is important not only to prevent short¬ 
term violence and instability, but to increase the possibility of 
a lasting peace in the area. While the US must be careful not to 
become the world's de facto policeman, it is not in the US 
interest, as the world's sole super power, to be perceived as 
having turned away from its responsibilities in the aftermath of 
the Gulf War. The War in the Persian Gulf has had a profound 
impact on the political and military thinking and attitudes of both 
the governments and populations of the US and Iraq as well as other 
states with influence in the region. Changes in alliances between 
countries of the Middle East and the US and within the region are 
inevitable even though some governments are experiencing difficulty 
transitioning from heavy handed policies which protect the status 
quo. Governments which become proactive in managing change, 
however, are likely to be the governments least adversely affected 
by changes as they evolve. 

This paper reviews the evolution of the Kurds in Iraq by 
examining their transition from a powerless ethnic group to a 

growing political entity that will play an instrumental role in the 
future status of Iraq as a nation state. The focus is on the 
potential of the Kurdish people to obtain some degree of autonomy 
and then successfully function as part of a central pluralistic 
governmental framework within Iraq. Autonomy is sometimes 
misunderstood, but according to Lawrence Ziring of Western Michigan 

Autonomy refers to administrative decision 
making by and for a particular ethnic, 
linguistic, religious, or otherwise specific 
cultural entity. Autonomy is not the same as 
sovereignty. An autonomous region operates 
within the confines of a larger political 
entity that is sovereign and hence preeminent. 

Autonomous regions, for example, are not 
empowered to organize their own army, carry on 
their own foreign policy, or issue their own 
currency. They have delegated powers that 
allow them to administer their daily affairs, 
but they do not possess independent political 

Even so, the thought of such a proposition increases the fears of 
Iraq's neighbors who are concerned that this would only be a first 
step in the quest for an independent Kurdish state. After all, 
several of these neighbors have large Kurdish populations that they 
have oppressed since the fall of the Ottoman empire. 

It could be argued that the past instability caused by the 
Kurds in their persistent quest for autonomy has contributed to the 
balance of power in the region by requiring local governments (who 
were not always friendly to the US) to commit an array of police, 
security operatives and military assets to keep the Kurds in check. 
This notwithstanding, the Kurds in northern Iraq are now 
beneficiaries of the Persian Gulf War, and it must be recognized 


that unprecedented change is underway regarding relations between 
the Kurds and other opposition groups and how they will ultimately 
deal with the central government in Baghdad. In this paper the 
premise is accepted that the Kurds have already attained a degree 
of autonomy in Iraqi Kurdistan made possible by the security zone 
established by and protected by coalition military forces. 
Therefore, the effort expended here is to explore whether the Kurds 
possess the capability to self rule, and the sophistication to do 
so in a manner in which their neighbors will acquiesce and support 
from their coalition sponsors will continue. 


Most of the modern nations of the Middle East were created as 
a result of agreements between the British and the French at the 
end of World War I. Much of the region had belonged to the Turkish 
Ottoman Empire for over 400 years. Since Turkey was defeated in 
the war, Britain and France became the chief beneficiaries of the 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The area was divided into 
British and French spheres of influence by the arbitrary drawing 
of national borders without regard to ethnic and religious lines, 
or ancient water rights and tribal holdings. Great Britain in 
1918, only four days after signing the armistice, occupied what 
had been the oil rich Ottoman province of Mosul, in the southern 
part of Kurdistan. The Turks bitterly protested, but Ottoman 
Turkey was too weak to oppose the British. 


In 1920, the British and other Western allies established, in 
the Treaty of Sevres, a Kurdish homeland out of the remnants of an 
area in the eastern Ottoman Empire which the Kurds had 
demographically dominated for centuries. In 1921, the Turks, after 
having defeated the Greek army in Anatolia gained the leverage to 
demand the treaty's revision. The British then abandoned the idea 
of a pro-British Kurdistan and concentrated on keeping oil-rich 
Mosul. The plan was to attach the Kurdish inhabited Mosul area to 
two other former Turkish provinces—Sunni Baghdad in northern 
Mesopotamia and Shiite Basra in southern Mesopotamia. This would 
have created a wealthy, pro-British protectorate strategically 
located on the Gulf.^ These early maneuvers by the powers of the 
day to control both natural resources and transportation routes 
with little regard for the indigenous people reflect the accepted 
norms of victors of war throughout history. The lack of 
sophistication and overall cohesion, tribalism, multiple language 
dialects and most importantly the lack of a powerful sponsor are 
factors which contributed to the Kurds being left again without any 
territory of their own after World War I. As we trace the Kurds 
over the years since World War I, it becomes clear that successive 
governments in Iraq and the other countries with large Kurdish 
populations have, in varying extremes, attempted to assimilate the 
Kurds into their national fold by eradicating the Kurdish culture 
and suppressing them politically. 

In 1925, a League of Nations commission mandated that the 
province of Mosul be incorporated into the new British protectorate 


called Iraq. It also provided that the Kurds were to be given 
local autonomy and Kurdish made the official language. The Turks, 
determined to be pro-Western, finally agreed to give up Mosul and 
all of its oil for a mere 500,000 British pounds. Many Turks 
consider this a most unfortunate decision and have never accepted 
this oil-rich, non-Arab region as part of an Arab state.^ T a e 
Kurds, however, have never been able to achieve autonomy or the 
freedom of unrestricted use of the Kurdish language. They remain 
the only grouping of over 15 mil ..ion persons which has not achieved 
some form of national statehood.'^ 

These Kurdish issues of autonomy and language have been 
central tc the problems confronting Iraq since it was established 
in 1920. The name Kurdistan refers to an area situated on the 
border areas of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and the former Soviet 
Union which comprises the pastoral homeland of the nomadic Kurds of 
Indo-European origin. The Kurds have existed as a tribal people 
with their own cultural tradition and language for at least 3000 
years. Even so and despite their strong desire for independence 
from external authority, the Kurds have never been united under one 
ruler- The British Foreign an d Commonwealth Office reports in a 
May 1992 Background Brief that tribal divisions have always been 
deep, and that this coupled with political differences between 
conservative feudal leaders and left-wing radicals have led to easy 
exploitation by central governments.^ Although the Kurds are 
generally described as being a nomadic tribal people, many are 
settled agriculturists and most in Iraq live in urban areas. 


Increasing migration to urban areas in Iraq has tended to weaken 
tribal bonds, although most Kurds can trace their origins to 
particular tribes.^ 

The Kurds were generally subject to the nominal jurisdiction 
of the Shah of Iran or the Ottoman sultan until the end of World 
War I. Nevertheless, government authority was never universally 
accepted by the Kurds in either the Iranian or Ottoman areas. The 
years through 1932 saw many tribal uprisings and an attempt by the 
monarchy to assimilate tribal Kurds, but this activity caused a 
breach between the nationalist Kurds and the government. Social 
upheavals and internal political instability involving opposition 
groups have played a major role in Iraq's perception of its 
national security. This, along with recurrent revolts by the 
Kurdish minority, have consistently brought harsh responses from 
successive regimes to neutralize opposition forces and to restore 

Through the years until the 1960's in spite of the 
unwillingness of successive Iraqi governments to render more than 
lip service to Kurdish autonomy, Iraqi Kurds enjoyed many basic 
freedoms and perhaps most significantly, recognition of their 
separate ethnic status. While the Iraqi Kurds were generally free 
to do as they pleased so long as they caused no problems to the 
Iraqi government, the Kurds in Turkey and to a lesser extent a 
Iran were being persecuted more severely as Kurds.® 

The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) led by Mulla Mustapha 
Barzani conducted a fierce campaign in the 1960's against the 


Baghdad government, which feared that Kurdish successes would lead 
to the secession of Kirkuk, a major oil producing area. The Baath 
Party which had come to power in 1968, determined to end political 
turmoil, by 1970, had thwarted several coup attempts and achieved 
an increased level of stability within the country.^ The Baath 
Party believed that most Western countries, particularly the United 
States, opposed the goal of Arab unity as evidenced by the 
partition of Palestine and creation of the state of Israel. This, 
and the subsequent unwavering support to the security of Israel by 
the US, led Iraq to closer relations with the Soviet Union which 
had supported the Arabs during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli 
Wars.^° As the KDP campaign gained momentum, the Baath Party 
realizing the overall need to stabilize things agreed to 
negotiations, which in March 1970 culminated in a 15-point peace 
plan. Salient provisions of the plan stipulated: 

—that Kurds would participate fully in the government and 
army, and one national vice-president would be a Kurd; 

—that Kurdish officials would administer areas populated by 
a Kurdish majority; 

—that Kurdish areas would receive a fair share of economic 

—that Kurdish nationality would be recognized and Kurdish 
designated an official language in Kurdish areas with Arabic; and 
—a census would be taken to determine those areas with a 
Kurdish majority. 


The Iraqi government, however, made little progress in 
implementing the agreement even though i.t later promulgated an 
autonomy law in 1974. This was the first real show of how shrewd 
Saddam Hussein could be regarding the Kurdish issue and his 
commitment to Arab nationalism. The tactics employed were to 
alternate the use of force with major concessions designed to 
appease and delay the Kurds until Saddcun could consolidate his 
strength. Then ruthless suppression followed. The 1974 autonomy 
law was rejected by the Kurds as falling short of the previous 
agreement with special emphasis on the lack of representation in 
the central government. Control of oil-rich Kirkuk also remained 
an resolved issue as the Iraqi government failed to conduct a 
census. The Iraqi government feared that a census would show a 
Kurdish and Turcoman majority, thus substantiating the arguments 
for incorporation of Kirkuk into the Kurdish autonomous region. 
Fighting again erupted with the Kurds receiving support from Iran 
until the 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran. 
Subsequently, the Iraqi government initiated a construction program 
in Kurdish areas, redistributed land and allowed the return of some 
40,000 Kurds who had been resettled in southern Ira^. In July 
1983, during the Iran/Iraq War, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK), created in 1975 by a breakaway faction of the KDP as a 
leftist, urban and modernizing organization led by Jalal Talabani, 
joined the KDP in fighting against the Iraqi government. The KDP 
initiative was supported by Iranian troops and Iraqi Shiite 
elements armed with weapons supplied by Iran.^^ 


By 1987/ Kurdish military and political strength had 
progressively grown through rapprochement of the KDP and PUK and 
subsequent formation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front, a coalition of 
five Kurdish parties. This was a giant step forward for the Kurds 
inasmuch as it signaled the beginning of a greater understanding of 
the concepts of organization, unity and cohesion that would later 
serve them well in the post-Persian Gulf War era. In any case, 
once the Iranian military threat diminished in the south, Saddam 
unleashed a major offensive action against the Kurds in the north 
destroying some 3000 Kurdish villages and relocating some 300,000 
persons to camps, first in the south and later in the north. He 
eliminated a large number of male Barzani tribe members, and used 
chemical weapons killing several thousand more Kurds. 

In late February 1991, just after Iraq's defeat by the 
multinational coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War, large 
numbers of Shia in the areas between Basra and Baghdad as well as 
Kurds in the north revolted against the central government in 
Baghdad. Both groups had been encouraged by public calls from 
George Bush, the US President, to revolt against Saddam and his 
regime. Saddam, however, was able to marshal his forces and 
successfully put down both revolts, containing the Shia in the 
south, and causing hundreds of thousands of Kurds to flee and take 
refuge in the mountains along the Iraqi/Turkish border. The 
United Nations and US led coalition forces intervened on a 
humanitarian basis and established a temporary security zone in the 
north, relocated the Kurds from the mountains and provided life 


sustaining humanitarian assistance to them. The Iraqi government 
cooperated with the UN and signed Memoranda of Understanding 
allowing this humanitarian endeavor to proceed. Iraq, however, 
continues to violate the terms of UN resolution 688 which demands 
an end to repression in Iraq and cooperation with humanitarian 
ef forts 


The Kurds have been perceived as a warlike, dirty, backward, 
illiterate and generally slow-witted people.^* They have often 
been held in scorn and contempt. Their long history of warlike 
activities as reflected in them serving as mercenaries in the 
armies of the Middle East and southern Caucasus have led to 
characterizations of them being violence prone. As late as August 
1992, the Kurds were being branded as "bandits" by Iraqi Dictator 
Saddam Hussein as they levied taxes at checkpoints on Turkish 
truckers bringing goods through Iraqi Kurdistan and returning with 
oil products from the large refinery in Mosul. The sale of 
gasoline in Turkey by these vendors, in violation of the 
international trade embargo against Iraq, brings about 150 times 
the price paid for it.”"^ The banditry (if one chooses to label it 
that) associated with this activity might well be overshadowed by 
the previous pressure tactic of the Saddam government of stopping 
the shipment of all fuel, food and supplies to the Kurdish areas, 
including children's vaccines donated by the United Nations.^® 
Without the supplies being brought to and through Iraqi Kurdistan 


on the road from Turkey and the revenues generated from the 
taxation on this activity, Kurdish survival would indeed be further 
strained. Such activity is not new as for centuries each of the 
major Empires— Greek, Roman, Mongul, Persian and Ottoman have had 
to contend with the Kurds who ostensibly demanded some remuneration 
for use of the major communication and transportation routes they 
controlled between the West and the Far East. This activity has 
added to the perception of the Kurds as being bandits. 

Even as recently as the summer of 1992, there were some local 
militias operating independently in the countryside of Kurdistan 
who were levying taxes at checkpoints and appropriating vehicles 
and machinery to sell in Iran.^’ A primary issue is whether the 
Kurdish people can unite behind the governmental legislature that 
was elected in May and sworn in on July 4th, 1992. This would give 
some legitimacy to actions that would otherwise be viewed as 
banditry in the international community. This newly elected 
government has appointed a police force and school administration. 
It also levies taxes, collects garbage, delivers mail and oversees 
an army. 

The Kurds have been perceived by others in literature as a 
highly illiterate people with severe dialectal differences within 
their language which serve as obstacles to their unity.Although 
there are four major Kurdish dialect groups, all varieties of 
Kurdish are Indo-European and thus belong to the same linguistic 
family as the Persian language. Efforts to develop a standard, 
pan-Kurdish language despite many attempts by Kurds have been 


unsuccessful. This is attributable, in large part, to the physical 
fragmentation, mutual isolation and constant restrictions suffered 
by the Kurds. Such a goal is not insurmountable as was 
demonstrated by neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran 
and Syria who overcame their own dialectal differences.^^ These 
countries were able to overcome the problem, at least partially, 
through the central government promulgation of official national 
languages and educational policies that enhanced the learning of a 
common language. 

Literacy is considered a measure of modernization and often 
reflects the policies of central governments toward their ethnic 
minorities. While there is little statistical documentation 
supporting the exact extent of literacy and in what language, we do 
know that either the teaching of the Kurdish language itself or 
teaching subjects using Kurdish has been restricted in varying 
degrees in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. Literacy in Arabic, 
however, has been encouraged. Levels of literacy tend to be higher 
in areas where Kurdish is used in school curriculums. Some 
estimates reflect that as many as 91 percent of Kurdish women are 
illiterate.Iraqi Kurds have received sporadic education at the 
primary and secondary levels in Kurdish as well as Arabic and have 
enjoyed the benefits of their own university established at 
Sulaymania (recently moved to Arbil). Thus, Iraqi Kurds by far 
have the highest literacy rate and are the best educated of all 
Kurds in Kurdistan. 


with an average literacy rate of 52 percent, the Kurds in 
Iran are the least literate of the major Iranian nationalities.^^ 
By contrast, the Persian language has traditionally been the medium 
for instruction in Iran, although since the Islamic Revolution of 
1979, use of minority languages has been allowed in the press and 
mass media.Ethnic literature was also allowed to be taught in 
schools at all levels. Undoubtedly an increase in literacy and 
general education will be reflected in the next Iranian census to 
be taken in 1996. Turkey forbade the use of Kurdish in 1924, but 
partially and unofficially relaxed the policy in the 1950's. 
However, in the 1980's the policy was reversed and toughened. Such 
restrictions have resulted in a marked imbalance in the level of 
education between Kurds and other citizens in Turkey, with Kurds 
attaining less than half the national average for education.In 
late 1991, the Turks officially sanctioned the publication of a few 
Kurdish newspapers and journals.It is too soon to know whether 
Turkey will continue and possibly further liberalize policies to 
include the educational realm which would enhance the socioeconomic 
integration of the Kurds into Turkish society. 

In any case, we know that language has long been a unifying 
issue among the Kurdish people and symbolizes the very continuation 
of the Kurdish culture. All Kurdish national groups have 
consistently demanded the use of Kurdish as an official language. 
While these efforts have been uniformly thwarted in Iraq, Turkey, 
Iran and Syria, Kurdish music has come to symbolize Kurdish 
resistance to the anti-language policies. In several countries. 


even the singing of baby lullabies is illegal. Pauletta Otis in a 
case study on the Kurds, completed for the US Department of 
Defense, concludes that "Language has taken on a symbolic 
character far above its functional value.An argument could be 
made that it is just this type of symbolism that can unify a people 
or groups involved in political struggles. This is certainly 
apparent in the persistency of the Kurds in seeking to maintain 
their language. History is replete with examples of the 
suppression of minority languages by repressive or majority 
governments as a measure to control minority populations in the 
assimilation process, ensuring the stability of the state or status 
quo. Language is viewed as basic to the perpetuation of a nation. 
Whether the Kurds have fully understood the overall positive 
ramifications of the language issue beyond the strictly cultural 
aspects is not clear. 

Kurdistan is an unofficially recognized, contiguous area 
situated on the borders of Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. Most 
Kurds are Sunni Muslims. These include the Kurds living in Iraq, 
Turkey, Iran and Syria. The Arabs living in the area of Iraq 
immediately to the south of the security zone established by the 
coalition forces are also Sunni Muslims who comprise about 35 
percent of the Iraqi population. This area includes Baghdad and 
currently the oil producing areas of Mosul and Kirkuk which are 
located on the southern edge of Kurdistan.(map Figure 1) Although 
Mosul is mostly inhabited by Arabs, the surrounding area is 
primarily populated by Kurds. Most of the residents of Kirkuk are 


also Kurds. These areas are strictly controlled by Saddam 
Hussein's government. About 62 percent of the Iraqi population are 
Arab Shiite Muslims. They predominately inhabit the southeastern 
part of Iraq which borders Iran.(map Figure 2) The great majority 
of the Iranian people are Persian Shiite Muslims. 

Some political analysts have voiced strong concern about the 
potential risks to western interests that would be associated with 
an Iraq ruled by Shiite Muslims. This concern peaked when Muslims 
violently rejected the western way of life in Iran following the 
expulsion of the Shah. Even though Iran has become more moderate 
under President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, many in the US still vividly 
recall the 1979 takeover of the US Embass- with disdain. The 
Islamic fundamentalist and anti-western fervor inspired by the 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, seen nightly on television news 
programs in the west, promoted anti-Islamic perceptions in the west 
and further damaged US-Iranian relations. This display of anti- 
Americanism led to a fear of the spread of Iranian Shiite 
fundamentalism to Iraq and directly affected US policies which 
became more favorable toward Iraq, The extent of animosity that 
existed between predominately Shiite Iran and Iraq, as demonstrated 
by the eight-year Iran/Iraq War from 1980-1988, might well have 
been under estimated by Western observers. 

In retrospect, it is quite clear that a fundamental 
incompatibility existed between Iraqi Arab nationalism and Iranian 
Islamic fundamentalism.^® The belief that ties between Persian 
Shiite Muslims and Arab Shiite Muslims would automatically prevail 


over nationalism was simply incorrect. The underlying differences 
between the two states proved too difficult to reconcile and 
ultimately led to the Iran/Iraq War. During the war, the US tilted 
toward and provided some assistance to Iraq in an attempt to 
contain Shiite Islamic fundamental'sm and maintain a balance of 
power in the region. Saddam, when given the chance, further 
neutralized the appeal of revolutionary Iran to Iraqi Shiites by 
allowing the Iranians to bomb Shiite areas of Iraq with virtual 

The lingering fear of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism 
later constrained the US in its response to the Shia call for 
support after they rebelled against the Saddam Hussein regime in 
the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The Iraqi Kurds caught 
in the middle of the Iraqi escapades for dominance have given their 
support to whatever patron was more supportive of their cause. 
This has raised the question of Kurdish loyalties although the 
strong implication is that the Kurds have been primarily interested 
in achieving their own goals. During the Iran/Iraq War, the Kurds 
were generally opposed to both Iran and Iraq given the nature of 
their repressive policies toward the Kurds. The Kurds, rather than 
risk supporting the losing side and incurring the wrath of the 
winner, chose to play both ends against the middle. While the 
Kurds survived the war, they are now labeled as traitors and 
disloyal elements by both Iran and Iraq.^° 

The US, its western allies, and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries are all opposed to the idea of Islamic fundamentalist 


rule in Iraq. Therefore, it is important to take a closer look at 
Islam and put it in a more correct perspective as we help construct 
policies for the region. Clearly, the Kurdish problem in northern 
Iraq cannot be adequately addressed without developing viable 
policies in dealing with the Shia problem in southern Iraq. It 
could be argued that Islam per se poses no threat to western 
societies. However, it is just as important to understand that 
Islam can and has served as a ur tying force for political and 
military movements for many centuries. Islam is a powerful 
motivator for the masses and could become the dynamic element for 
political change. 

Saddam uses Islam as a galvanizer and to reach the people in 
the streets of Iraq. His ruthless behavior over time, however, has 
seemingly disallowed him the complete seduction of Arabs to rally 
behind his causes. For example, when Saddam called upon Islam to 
unite Arabs in a holy war against the coalition forces, it simply 
did not work- Nonetheless, the powers of Islam as a unifying 
element can be especially significant where there exists 
inefficient, and/or unfair and discriminatory governmental systems 
wielding power over majority Muslim populations. It is important, 
however, that governments dealing with situations such as the 
Iran/Iraq balance of power understand the limitations of Islam so 
that appropriate diplomatic or military responses can be used when 
necessary. Religion appears to be but one factor in the very 
complex business of analysis of the motivations involving people in 
the struggle between ethnicity, nationalism and self-rule. 


Before the coalition established the Shia security zone in 
southern Iraq in 1992, some political analysts believed the Shia 
might come to power in Iraq by taking advantage of their vastly 
larger numbers and overthrow the ruling Sunnis led by Saddam 
Hussein. This thinking was more common prior to the 1980's, but 
was ostensibly not sufficiently alleviated by the Iran/Iraq War. 
Even though Iraq had expelled between 40,000 and 120,000 Persian 
Shia before the war, this neutralization of the threat of an 
Iranian sponsored fifth column did not allay the fears of a 
possible Iraqi Shia revolt.There were good reasons for such 
thinking. Almost all of the army officer corps had long been 
comprised of Sunnis who never allowed the Shia to gain any real 
power in the army. The primary mission of the army was the 
preservation of internal order over a population that was more than 
60 percent Shiite, and 20 percent Kurd. 

Since the 1980's, most top government posts, including that 
of President Saddam Hussein, have been held by Sunnis, thus 
continuing to drive a wedge between the Sunnis and Shias.^^ Of 
course, the concern about the Shia taking control became somewhat 
dormant in the 1980's when the Iraqi army (largely comprised of 
Islamic Shia soldiers) was preoccupied in a war with Iran. Iran 
was left economically and militarily weakened by the war and has 
since embarked upon a progrcuti of rebuilding. Although President 
Rafsanjani has improved relations with the west, there remains a 
powerful radical fundamentalist faction within Iranian political 
and religious circles. Iranian Islamic fundamentalists do not 


appear to have any substantial influence over the Shia in southern 
Iraq. There are even indications they are being moderated within 
the Iranian government. 


Iraq has been a fragmented society struggling for nativ^nal 
unity for over 70 years. The country's borders have no historical 
basis and its society consists of minorities who remain fragmented. 
The larger groups which include Sunnis , Shias, and Kurds; and the 
smaller groups of Turcomans, Jews and Christians have been unable 
to evolve into a cohesive society as the imposition of central 
government policies has perpetuated existing volatile social 
conditions and fostered mutual antagonism and suspicion.In Iraq 
political organizations were far less developed than those in 
Turkey, Syria or Iran as late as the 1940's. Baathist ideas were 
brought to Iraq by Syrian teachers late in 1949. The Baathists 
tied the fulfillment of the emerging pan-Arab idea to the 
disappearance of imperialism from the Arab world. In essence the 
Baath party ideology was based on Arab nationalism and designed to 
resolve the problem of minorities. The party was fraught with 
internal struggles aggravated by ideological ambiguity which led to 
the various military and civilian leaders to embrace different 
aspects of socialist, secular, religious or revolutionary doctrine 
to achieve their goals. This led to the emergence of divergent 
groups and military cabals each vying for Baathist leadership. 
Finally in 1968 the Baathists took power through a military-led 


coup. They had once before, in 1963, reigned for a short period of 
9 months after a successful coup. This time around they have 
systematically neutralized their opposition, including the Kurds, 
for 25 years through a mix of oppressive measures, ideology, and 
the machinations of a charismatic leader - Saddam Hussein. 

Many of the long list of Kurdish political parties have become 
more or less irrelevant over the years. Strong tribal allegiances 
remain an important part of Kurdish society and modern leaders must 
have support from the tribal leaders in order to survive. Two 
Kurdish parties which remain relevant and have been active during 
the reign of Saddam Hussein and the Baath party are the Kurdish 
Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). In 
northern Iraqi Kurdistan the KDP led by Masoud Barzani is the more 
traditional party with firm grass-roots connections through tribal 
and local elders and community leaders.In central Kurdistan the 
PUK led by Jalal Talabani is a more sophisticated, modern and urban 
organization with strong connections with southern Kurdistan in 
Iran. The PUK is less religious and less tribal oriented. The PUK 
refers to the KDP as " the hillbillies who never cease to be an 
embarrassment and who never lose an opportur Ity to lose an 

Much has been written about the negative aspects of 
traditional tribal politics and the associated antiquated methods 
of doing business. National coherence has long evaded the Kurds 
due in large part to their tribal social structure. In this 
century, however, tribalism has waned and nomadism all but 


disappeared as Kurds have become urban dwellers. Still, even 
modern Kurdish leaders such as Jalal Talabani despite his 
understanding of the West and long European residence has been 
unable to completely stifle old tribal affinities and some 
rivalries. Kurdish leaders have not always been judged by their 
followers against the same standards as leaders in the West where 
diplomacy is important. Kurdish leaders are looked upon as 
concerned fathers as much as political leaders. Therefore, their 
mistakes have seldom weakened their position as leaders as long as 
they were perceived as doing what they could and the fundamental 
virtues of courage, loyalty, dignity, and magnanimity were 
maintained.The traditional power that had been wielded by tribal 
chiefs or aghas, and to a lesser extent by Muslim sheiks came under 
se] f examination at the end of the Iran/Iraq War. Kurdish 
intellectuals and midlevel commanders ultimately blamed the 
traditional Kurdish leaders for several major setbacks in their 
progress. These included the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion in 
1975, the initiation of provocative actions that resulted in 
Saddam's use of chemical weapons against them, the destruction of 
their villages, and the massive relocation campaign in the 
1980's.^® This led in 1988, to the formation of the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Front (IKF) from eight major Kurdish parties to begin 
representing Kurdish interests.Although they continue to play 
a major role in Kurdish affairs, there has been a gradual 
assumption of power from the tribal chiefs and sheiks. This became 
apparent when the IKF took over the political and civil 


administration of Iraqi Kurdistan after the withdrawal of the Iraqi 
central government from northern Iraq. 


James Prince, a program assistant in the Middle East Studies 
department at the Council on Foreign Relations, recently wrote that 
"United States policy toward the Iraqi Kurds was based on benign 
neglect and political containment."*'^ This statement implies that 
the US has had some responsibility to the Kurds, but history 
clearly contradicts this notion. It would be more accurate to say 
that the US has preferred to pursue foreign policy with officially 
recognized governments of countries in the Middle East without 
.involving itself in the internal politics of these countries. 
Illustrative of this is the action taken by the US Secretary of 
State which directed that all contact with Iraqi dissidents cease 
after Iraq formally complained about the US Department of State 
receiving Jalal Talabani in 1988. This policy was later reinforced 
when Talabani, even with support from congressional leaders, was 
again rebuffed by the State Department in August 1990, after Iraq 
had invaded Kuwait. 

It took the 1991 uprising of the Kurds following the Gulf War, 
their subsequent flight, and the hosting of Kurdish leaders by the 
French, British, and Turkish leaders before the US government 
capitulated and set conditions for meetings with the Kurds. 
Massive media coverage showing the inhumane conditions being 
endured by Kurdish families and harsh actions being perpetrated 


against the Kurds by Saddam's military forces had mobilized 
American public opinion to call for the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to the Kurds. The large death toll among men, women and 
especially children evoked direct criticism from the media of the 
US government for its failure to assist the Kurds and support the 
Iraqi opposition. Finally, the State Department after 
reconsidering its policies set the conditions to meet with the 
Kurds by stating that it would not support any elements that 
sought the dismemberment of Iraq and further stipulated that; 

—the kurdish delegation must be representative and 
include all religious and sectarian opposition elements; and 

—the Kurds must allay the fears of their neighbors, 
namely Turkey, that they harbored secessionist tendencies.*^ US 
concerns about protecting Turkish interests is understandable 
inasmuch as Turkey has served as the security anchor to NATO, in 
the south, as a full member since 1952. Turkish security concerns 
had long focused on the Soviet Union and although this dissipated 
with the dissolution of the USSR, Turkey remains a pro-Western 
oriented ally. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, Turkey quickly confirmed 
that NATO would come to its aid in the event of an attack by Iraq. 
In early April 1991, while the US was grappling with what to do 
about the Kurds, Turkey was faced with the more immediate 
humanitarian problem of providing life sustaining assistance to 
some 500,000 Kurds who were either massed along or had already 
crossed into Turkish border areas. The Turkish government was 
reluctant to allow the Kurdish refugees to move out of the 


mountains to more accessible areas within Turkey for fear it would 
incur the long-term obligation for their care and feeding. 

It soon became clear that the situation had become untenable 
and the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Kurds was 
unsustainable. Ever mindful that the world was watching as the 
Kurdish drama unfolded Turkish President Turgut Ozal, rather than 
languishing in this untenable situation, decided to act. Ozal 
concluded that the best solution was to move the Kurdish refugees 
back to northern Iraq, but realized this was impossible without 
providing the Kurds protection against Iraqi forces. This was a 
very important and pivotal juncture in Turkish policy towards Iraq. 
Until this point, Turkey had been "firmly in opposition to any sort 
of partition of Iraq either implicit or explicit, which would imply 
acceptance of the idea of Kurdish autonomy.Nonetheless, Ozal 
suggested that a safehaven be established for the Kurds in northern 
Iraq, through UN auspices, which was supported by Britain and the 
US. This ultimately led to the initiation of Operation Provide 
Comfort by coalition forces which established the currently 
existing security zone to which the Kurds returned. Although most 
ground forces have been withdrawn, the security zone continues to 
be protected by a coalition special air detachment retained at the 
Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey. The Turkish parliament has so 
far renewed the mandate of the security force as well as their 
cooperation in support of the security zone in six-month 



After the Baathists gained power in 1968, Iraq was viewed in 
American circles as being run by radical pro-Soviet extremists. 
This perception precluded serious consideration of Iraq as a 
potential pro-Western ally or even as a country with which to have 
dialogue.^ The Baathist commitment to the fulfillment of pan- 
Arabism and the eradication of imperialism from the Arab world adds 
only another dimension to the problem. In addition, an 
understanding of Iraq's strategic goals as expressed by Christine 
Moss Helms in 1984, provides a portent of possible future 
difficulties to be expected in dealing with Iraq. Helms wrote 

All states have minimum strategic 
requirements, foremost of which are the 
security of the state, national cohesion, and 
access to the resources necessary to function 
effectively as an economic and political 
entity. In Iraq these requirements include 
distribution rights to the waters of the 
Tigris and Euphrates rivers, economic and 
political integration of the northern Kurdish 
and southern Shia areas within the state, 
security of oil reserves and facilities, and 
guaranteed safe passage for trade through the 
Shatt al-'Arab and the Gulf. No treaty or 
policy that fails to guarantee these rights 
can be expected to ensure for long an attitude 
of trust or stability in the development of 
relations between Iraq and its neighbors or 
with its foreign allies...A starting point in 
developing the common interests of Iraq and 
outside powers would be an expression of 
mutual commitment to the territorial integrity 
of nations and respect for the principle of 
noninterference in the domestic affairs of 
other countries. 


Iraq under Saddam Hussein can be expected to be unyielding in 
seeking the fulfillment of these strategic requirements. Saddam 
sees himself as a great and influential leader as well as the 
champion of all Arabs- He enjoys the popular support of large 
segments of the people in many Arab countries even though most Arab 
governments were against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The people 
understand that Saddam is brutal and repressive but tend to support 
his stand against the perceived evils of the West. Many Arabs on 
the street have been convinced by Saddam that Western actions are 
motivated by neo-colonialist aims designed to ensure access to oil 
at cheap prices.'^ There is little documented information that 
supports any real intention of Saddam to more fully integrate the 
Kurds or Shia into the Iraqi political or economic spheres. 


It is well known that the Kurds' own tribalism and ideological 
differences, coupled with international indifference to their cause 
has impeded their progress. A milestone was achieved in 1988, 
when the eight Iraqi Kurdish parties stopped fighting each other, 
healed their internal rifts and formed the Iraqi Kurdistan Front. 
The IKF espouses goals committed to democracy for Iraq and 
autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan although a small minority of its 
members support a goal of independence for Kurdistan. The IKF 
Supreme Body comprised of two members of each party and chaired by 
the leaders of the two main parties, Jalal Talabani of the PUK and 
Massoud Barzani of the KDP, has provided political leadership and 


administration in Iraqi Kurdistan since establishment of the 
security zone by the coalition forces. 

In addition to the IKF, most opposition elements including the 
Kurds, Islamists, and former supporters of the Baath party were 
united into a single association that resulted in the Iraqi 
National Congress (INC). Kurdish leaders and religious Shia 
leaders from southern Iraq agreed to work together, and initiated 
a dialogue with over a dozen opposition leaders as early as 
December 1990. A lot of effort was expended leading up to proposed 
elections to ensure that the US wishes for a continuation of Iraqi 
territorial integrity be understood and advocated. 

Free elections were held in Iraqi Kurdistan on 19 May 1992, 
in which a 105-seat National Assembly was elected from the eight 
political parties and the few tribal leaders of the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Front. The IKF which has been running things since the Gulf War is 
now gradually transitioning authority to the elected Kurdish 
parliament. The KDP captured 45 percent of the vote, and the PUK 
won 43 percent in the elections which were conducted peacefully 
and considered fair by outside observers.The KDP heads the 
executive with a prime minister from the PUK and cabinet positions 
divided equally between the two parties. The vast majority of 
Kurds are represented by the KDP and PUK which have both openly 
support a federal system in Iraq, and are against moves toward 
Kurdish independence. 

Three of the IKF's parties have been pushing for an 
independent Kurdistan. They are The Party of Socialism in 


Kurdistan (PASOK), the Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party (KPDP), 
and the Kurdistan Socialist Party (KSP). The Islamic Party of 
Kurdistan is opting for an Isleunic state. None of these parties 
received the required 7 percent of the vote to win seats in the 
parliament. The Assyrian Democratic Movement whose numbers are in 
dispute were allocated five seats in parliament, irrespective of 
votes received, to prevent international criticism and local 
disapproval. The tribes were unable to muster the required 7 
percent threshold for representation in parliaunent and its leaders 
are frustrated as their power, prestige and authority 

The INC financially backed by Ahmad al-Chalabi, a European- 
based Iraqi banker and his brother, Hassan al-Chalabi, a former 
University of Baghdad law professor whose students included 
Talabani, sponsored meetings in places such as Damascus and Vienna 
in efforts to develop cohesion and a group supported political 
agenda. These efforts paid off as an eight-member INC delegation 
which included Barzani and Talabani was received by the US 
Department of State in July 1992. This was perceived by the 
diverse elements of the Iraqi opposition and most Middle East 
observers as signaling US support for the newly elected Kurdish 
government, and support for the Kurds in any future government in 
Iraq after Saddam's ouster. After the visit to Washington, 
unprecedented cohesion and coordination followed among Kurdish 
leaders. Other opposition groups that had remained skeptical about 


Kurdish aspirations now formally recognized the Kurdish lead which 
included advocation of a Kurdish state within a federated Iraq.*^^ 

Federalism, however, is the most contentious issue of concern 
to some groups within Iraq, while other Islamic groups outside Iraq 
seem only to be acquiescing to the Kurdish goals. Groups outside 
Iraq such as the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in 
Iraq and al-Dawa (both based in Iran), and Arab nationalists from 
Syria and Saudi Arabia voted to "respect" Kurdish aspirations only 
after much heated debate in a September 1992 conference. The vote, 
reportedly, was overwhelmingly in favor of the Kurdish position 
which suggests a positive aspect of the democratic process even if 
reflecting only half-hearted concurrence. It is important to note 
that Iraqi Sunni and Arab nationalists were the last holdouts 
against federalism. 

Other signs of caution were exhibited at the conference when 
the Shia violently protested against the Kurdish proposal to staff 
the INC Leadership Council of three with a Shia Muslim, a Sunni 
Muslim, and a Kurd. The Shia who comprise over 60 percent of 
Iraq's population felt underrepresented. The strength of the 
Kurdish position based in part on the real and perceived US 
support, as well as the international legitimacy and logistical 
support being provided to them, persuaded the conferees including 
the Shias to support the Kurdish proposal. Talabani nominated 
Barzani to one of the three posts on the Leadership Council. The 
other positions were filled by Mohammed Bahr al-Ulum, a moderate 
Shiite clergyman, and retired Sunni Major General Hassan al-Naquib. 


The move toward self-rule by Iraq's 3.5 million Kurds has concerned 
Turkey, Iran and Syria, which also have large Kurdish 

Economically, the international embargo against Iraq and the 
Iraqi blockade of the north have stifled economic activity in Iraqi 
Kurdistan. Agricultural products are unable to be exported, and 
many factories lack spare parts to operate. The landlocked Iraqi 
Kurdistan cannot function economically without an outlet through 
Turkey, Syria or Iran. 


When the countries of the Middle East were carved out of the 
Ottoman Empire, the Kurds then lost the opportunity in the early 
twentieth century to govern themselves. Thereafter, they have been 
a disenfranchised group dominated and oppressed by the host nations 
in which they live. Obviously, cultural, tribal and language 
idiosyncracies coupled with extreme oppression perpetrated against 
them, have encumbered their ability to emerge as an autonomous 
group. Although tribalism still exists, it is not the scune 
insurmountable obstacle of the past as Kurds have become more 
urbanized. The Kurds in Iraq are better educated with the highest 
literacy of all Kurds in Kurdistan. 

In the last 25 years, Iraq has failed under Baath Party and 
Dictator Saddam Hussein rule to establish a pluralistic political 
community. This has contributed immensely to the continuing 
inherent instability and violence which has dominated the political 


arena. After many years of struggle and revolt seeking to achieve 
democracy for Iraq and autonomy for Kurdistan, the Kurds got their 
big break—the Persian Gulf War. The Iraqi Army had become the 
fourth largest army in the world with a biological and chemical 
capability. This was considered, along with the US policy of using 
overwhelming force, when president Bush called for the Kurds in 
northern Iraq and the Shia in southern Iraq to rise against Saddam 
Hussein in the Persian Gulf War. The resulting crushing of both 
revolts by Saddam, and the ensuing flight and agony suffered by the 
Kurds brought them on center stage for the world to view. The US 
pressured by the media and responding to the humanitarian need, 
established along with coalition governments, a security zone in 
northern Iraq for the Kurds, and later in southern Iraq for the 
Shia. This has effectively split Iraq into three parts.(map Figure 
3) Subsequently, the Kurds by holding elections, establishing a 
government, and providing political and civil administration in 
their area, Iraqi Kurdistan, now in essence have de facto autonomy. 
This autonomy, however, cannot be sustained without US and 
coalition military protection. The US, even in the final days of 
the Bush administration, has demonstrated its resolve by continuing 
to insist on implementation of UN resolutions, and even resorted to 
military action to maintain protection of the southern security 

A review of the events leading up to the current situation in 
Iraq seems to suggest that the new Clinton administration should 
stay the policy course set by the Bush administration. Most policy 


makers recognize that access to oil and peace in the Middle East 
region are indeed in the US interest, but do not necessarily view 
US support to the Kurds as a means to those ends. Human rights, 
however, have been articulated as a part of the US international 
diplomatic agenda, and consequently cannot be ignored. Still it 
would be a mistake to view the Kurds and their aspirations for 
autonomy as the primary US goal in Iraq. Nonetheless, if the US 
led coalition abandoned the Kurds while Saddam remains in power it 
would be perceived as a sign of weakness in the international arena 
and ultimately lead to renewed attacks by Saddam against the 
Kurds. The goal should be to maintain the regional balance of 
power and stability that can now only be achieved through a new 
political order in Iraq. The Kurds are simply in a unique position 
to benefit from the situation, and possibly become a part of the 
political structure that will follow the Saddam regime. 

Clearly, the Kurds now have de facto autonomy, and with 
coalition security support, have led Iraqi opposition groups to 
unprecedented levels of cooperation. In their quest for self- 
government, the Kurds are openly committed to the preservation of 
Iraqi territorial integrity, a pre-condition of continued US 
support. This should be the primary determinant of current US 
policy, rather than to allow policy to be driven by the known 
desire of the Kurds to one day have their own separate state. The 
Kurds simply could not be successful in any endeavor to achieve 
autonomy in a separate state in the current political climate. 
Iraqi Kurdistan is a landlocked area which requires access to the 


transportation routes of neighboring countries for the transhipment 
of goods. Turkey now reluctantly allows humanitarian assistance and 
security elements to operate from its territory. However, neither 
Turkey nor any other neighbor of Iraqi Kurdistan would support or 
cooperate in the existence of a Kurdish state. 

Iraq with its pluralistic characteristics is unworkable as it 
has been governed in the past, especially under Saddam Hussein. 
Therefore, some type federation of autonomous provinces may indeed 
be the best next step for Iraq since, at present, there appears to 
be no viable alternative. 


Ethnoreligious Groups 

“tr^r.c re:.g:c;.s crc-ps 
pe'c&*"-t c‘ pcp«:at.or 

IX K vrr^r^. 


^Lawrence Ziring, The Middle East; A Political Dictionary 
fSanta Barbara. Ca.! ABC-CLIO. Inc.. 1992 ) 84-85. 

^ Robert D. Kaplan, "Iraqi Indigestion," The New Republic , 
(October 1990):14. 

^Ibid., 15. 

'^Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in 
Iraq, Saddam's Iraq; Revolution or Reaction (London; Zed Books 
Ltd., 1986), 177. 

^Foreign & Commonwealth Office, The Kurdish Problem in Iraq 
(London, May 1992), 1. 

^Pauletta Otis, Displaced Civilians in Zones of Conflict, 
Case Study; The Kurds (United States Army, January 1990) 9-12. 

^Helen Chapin Metz, Iraq; A Country Study (Washington, 
D.C.; Department of the Army, 1990), 215-16. 



“'“ibid., 203. 

^^Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2. 

^^ibid, 4. 

^^ibid., 3. 

’’^Ibid, 4. 

“■^Ibid, 4-6. 

^^Otis, 10. 

Chris Hedges, "Kurds Creating a Country on the Hostile 
Soil of Iraq," New York Times . 12 August 1992, Al. 


^’Hedges, A1,A6. 

2°Otis, 15-16. 


^^Mehrdad R. Izady, The Kurds; _ A Concise Handbook 

{Washington, D.C.; Taylor & Francis, Inc., 1992) 179. 

Short, Martin and Anthony McDermott. The Kurds. London: 
Minority Group Studies Report, 1981, p.6. 

^^Izady, 179. 

^'^Izady, 180. 


^^Izady, 179-80. 

2^0tis, 15-16. 

^®Christine Moss Helms, Iraqi; Eastern Flank of the Arab 
World (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 1984) 151. 

^^Kaplan, 15. 

^°0tis, 36. 

^’’Helms, 187. 

^^Metz, 95-6, 

^^Abbas Kelidar, Iraq, The Search for Stability (London: 
The Eastern Press, 1975) 3. 

^"^Ibid, 7. 

^^Izady, 207. 


^^Ibid., 206. 

James Prince, "A Kurdish State in Iraq? Current History 
(January 1993): 18. 

^^Ibid, 20. 





Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf 
Crisis, International Affairs 68,4 (1992): 688. 

‘^Helms, 204. 

^^ibid., 205. 

'^^Mary E. Morris, "Regional Dynamics of the Gulf Crisis." 
Paper presented to U.S. Naval Reserve, February 7, 1991, Los 

Angeles, California. 

^^Prince, 18-9. 

"-^Ibid., 19-20. 

^^Ibid., 21-22. 


^^Associated Ptess, "Iraqi Opposition Picks Leaders," 
Washington Post , 1 November 1992, p. A35. 




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